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Preface 
About the MATISSE project 
The MATISSE (Methods and Tools for Integrated Sustainability Assessment) project is funded by the 
European Commission, DG Research, within the 6th Framework Programme. The project is interested 
in the role that Integrated Sustainability Assessment (ISA) could play in the process of developing and 
implementing policies capable of addressing persistent problems of unsustainable development and 
supporting transitions to a more sustainable future in Europe. The core activity of MATISSE is to 
develop, test and demonstrate new and improved methods and tools for conducting ISA.  
This work is carried out through developing and applying a conceptual framework for ISA, looking at 
the linkages to other sustainability assessment processes, linking existing tools to make them more 
useable for ISA, developing new tools to address transitions to sustainable development and applying 
the new and improved tools within an ISA process through a series of case studies.  
The extent to which the case studies are carrying out a complete ISA for their area of focus varies 
between attempts to cover all phases of an ISA process to partial implementation of the process. 
Equally, different case studies are oriented to developing and testing tools and approaches to some, but 
not all, of the methodological challenges of ISA. The case studies are complementary, however, and 
the set of cases offers the opportunity to address a wide range of methodological challenges and to 
explore linkages between cases. An evaluation of practical experiences with ISA implementation in 
the case studies will provide guidance on the further improvement of methods and tools. Results will 
also contribute to more informed policy advice.  
What is ISA? 
Within the MATISSE project, Integrated Sustainability Assessment (ISA) has been defined as a 
cyclical, participatory process of scoping, envisioning, experimenting, and learning through which a 
shared interpretation of sustainability for a specific context is developed and applied in an integrated 
manner, in order to explore solutions to persistent problems of unsustainable development. ISA is 
conceptualised as a complement to other forms of sustainability assessment, such as Sustainability 
Impact Assessment, Integrated Assessment and Regulatory Impact Assessment. Whereas these other 
forms of assessment fulfil the pragmatic need for ex ante screening of incremental sectoral policies 
that are developed within the prevailing policy regime, ISA is conceptualised as a support to longer-
term and more strategic policy processes, where the objective is to explore persistent problems of 
unsustainable development that have a systemic pathology and possible solutions to these. ISA is 
therefore oriented toward supporting the development of cross-sectoral policies that specifically 
address sustainable development and at exploring enabling policy regimes and institutional 
arrangements. 
MATISSE Working Papers 
Matisse Working Papers are interim reports of project activities that are published in order to illustrate 
ongoing work and some provisional conclusions, as well as providing the opportunity for discussion of 
the approaches taken by the project and interim results. This discussion should be both within the 
project and between project members and the broader scientific and policy communities. Readers are 
encouraged to contact the authors to discuss the content of MATISSE Working Papers. 
 
Jill Jäger and Paul Weaver 
Editors of the MATISSE Working Paper Series 
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BIOFUELS AND THE ENVIRONMENT-DEVELOPMENT 
GORDIAN KNOT: INSIGHTS ON THE BRAZILIAN 
EXCEPTION 
1. Introduction 
Brazil is an agricultural giant that is in the process of becoming an energy giant as a biofuel exporter. 
Most OECD countries have expressed interest in Brazilian biofuels for coping both with the supply 
security and the climate risk. None of them has enough biofuel potential domestically. The prospect of 
a high oil export price provides a unique opportunity for Brazil to design a huge program of biofuel 
production and export (especially of ethanol) as a development boost and as a component of 
negotiating and implementing international climate accords. Brazil owns a unique stock of unused 
croppable land that could be harnessed for a huge biofuel export to the rest of the world. But part of it 
is also the largest forest in the world, with a huge potential for wood and other forest products, plus a 
natural carbon storage and a biodiversity wealth, not to forget the local climate equilibrium. Therefore 
Brazil is facing crucial choices on exploiting its biomass potential without losing so many positive 
externalities. 
This paper first puts into perspective the current Brazilian energy context and its implications for the 
strategy of this country in climate negotiations. Second it presents a numerical experiment aiming at 
disentangling the numerous impacts of large-scale exports of ethanol up to 2030 in the context of a 
world commitment to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at 450 ppm of CO2. Third there is an 
examination of the interplay between mechanisms that determine the impact of a large-scale 
development of the Brazilian biomass on the prices of food and pressure on forest in Brazil and how 
Brazil might pursue a dual aim of environment and development. Brazil’s emissions are dominated by 
the deforestation component, while the political expectations consist mainly in developing more 
rapidly and with a less unequal pattern.  
2. Climate-energy-development: the specifics of the Brazilian 
context 
2.1. Biomass energy and the new energy deal in Brazil 
Renewable energies (hydroelectricity and ethanol) make Brazil unique as a low GHG-emitter due to 
energy. Furthermore, it is in the process of strengthening its offshore oil production capacity and 
reversing its foreign exchange payment for energy. However this success story might not be enough to 
cope with future growth of demand for energy and fuels. Since the 1975 ProAlcool plan up to 2005, 
Brazil has been the biggest ethanol producer and the cane-to-ethanol route remains the most efficient; 
well ahead of the US corn-to-ethanol route. Brazil exported 20% of its total production of 17.5 billion 
liters in 2006-07. The local ethanol use represented 50% of the volume and 35% of the useful energy 
in the automotive fuel consumed in Brazil. In total 14% of the national total primary energy demand is 
derived as a fuel from ethanol or as heat and electricity from the bagasse burnt in the cane-processing 
plants. 
In 1975 the ProAlcool plan was backed by a vast array of measures: administered price, subsidies, 
public loans, private loans with a public guarantee. Between 1997 and 1999 prices were liberalized. 
There is no more direct financial aid but only tax exemptions in the public budget. The government 
still regulates the ethanol rate in the fuel: 25% before May 2006, then 20% due to a high sugar price, 
and 23% since November 2006. The World Resources Institute has calculated that Brazil has produced 
230 billion liters of ethanol, saving 52 billion (in 2003 US$)1 on oil imports and reducing CO2 
emissions by about 574 Mt since 1975 – that is about 10% of the country’s emissions. However the 
cumulative data do not account for the fluctuations in the plan. While in the mid-80s about three 
                                                 
1
 According to Goldemberg and al. (2003) quoted by Coelho (2005). 
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quarters of the cars were using ethanol, the high sugar price in 1989 caused a big enough reduction of 
ethanol demand for consumers’ confidence in a discredited ProAlcool plan to decline. In 2003, the 
market innovation of the flex-fuel cars opened a new area as the proportion of ethanol can go from 
25% of gasohol upwards. In 2006, the flex-fuel share represented 78% of the 1.1 million car sales and 
the stock was 2 out of 22 million (ANFAVEA, 2007). Most of the 32 000 gas stations in Brazil sell 
anhydrous ethanol (USDA, 2006). The flexibility of the technology allows for consumers to be 
protected against the risk of sugar and oil price fluctuations.  In 2004, the government has revisited its 
biodiesel program as part of a “green”  strategy. The legal share of 2% (in volume) is expected to be 
compulsory in 2008 and to increase it to 5% in 2013. However its high price remains an obstacle2. 
The ethanol success story is partly due to Brazil’s favorable agricultural conditions, conducive to low 
production costs (climate, land and labour). Private investors have brought capital, R&D, technical 
progress and growth. But this pattern may not be reproducible for biodiesel, which relies on numerous 
small producers, or even for an expanded ethanol program except if the state invests. Despite the high 
and sustained ethanol plan, Brazil has always maintained a high effort towards becoming self-
sufficient in oil by 2006, on the basis of the state-controlled company Petrobras. In 2007, the domestic 
demand is nearly at the level of domestic production at 1.9 million barrels a day. Since November 
2007, a famous offshore oil discovery at Tupi promises 5 to 8 billion barrels of high quality oil 
(approximately 40% of current reserves) plus associated gas. Brazil reserves would thus be between 
those of Venezuela and Nigeria. Brazil’s inherited low carbon energy mix is bound to mean a high 
marginal abatment cost curve in the future, except in the area of forest, land use and biomass derived 
GHG.  
3. Brazil stakes in the climate change negotiation 
Brazil is unique as a large country whose emissions are not dominated by fossil fuel sources. In Brazil 
more than 80% of GHG are emitted by agriculture or land-use change and forestry (LULUCF).  
Figure 1. Distribution of GHGs across sectors in Brazil 
  Waste 1.7%      
 
      
 
 
Source: 2000 database CAIT (www.cait.wri.org). 
 
This poses a specific problem, since the Kyoto framework poorly addresses deforestation the 
intensification of which could offset the abatements yielded by a full implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Brazil has kept referring to the Rio Convention principle of “a common but differentiated 
responsibility”. Brazil signed the Kyoto Protocol first and it aimed to stick to a pro-active vision likely 
                                                 
2
 The biodiesel program is thus a major area CDM projects with Annex 1 countries. 
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to be endorsed by the G77 or at least by a large number of developing countries. In 2005, the Brazilian 
President stressed that the parties to the Climate Convention should understand that Brazil could not 
sacrifice its employment and its rate of economic growth on the pretext of protecting climate as a 
public good and its own natural capital, while the lack of financial capital is a main bottleneck for its 
growth potential (NAE: Nucleo de Assuntos Estrategicos da Presidencia da Republica)3.  
Within these overall strategic principles shared by all the developing countries, the specific position of 
Brazil regarding its participation in an international agreement on climate change has two components:  
• deforestation, which Brazil recently accepted to be measured and part of GHG control; 
• the potential of ethanol to limit GHG emissions and to improve world energy security through 
large exports of biofuels over the short and middle term, without waiting for the second 
generation of bioenergy.  
3.1. Deforestation control : a sensitive dimension of any climate regime 
While deforestation in Brazil was estimated at 2.6 Mha/year from 1990 to 2000, it accelerated to 3.1 
Mha/year during 2000-2005. Brazil is one of the largest potential carbon sinks in the Land Use, Land-
Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector. According to the Stern report (2006), the 
Afforestation/Reforestation (A/R) has a truly low-cost emission-reduction potential in the range of 1 to 
5 US$/t CO2 avoided. This is a priority potential that was discussed with non Annex I Parties at the 
13th climate conference in Bali (December 2007). However the modalities under which a cap and 
trade system can draw perennial financial flows significant enough to control deforestation are far 
from being clear and cannot be easily extrapolated from the experience in other sectors. 
First, measurement uncertainties in GHG deforestation potentials hinder the necessary agreement on 
baselines and on the reality of the slowdown of deforestation. Technical and scientific measurement 
methods have not yet been agreed on. It is even still debated whether Amazonian tropical forest is a 
GHG sink or a source. Biomass quantities are assessed by satellite images combined with field 
measures. The range of values varies considerably. Reis (1992) indicated a range of 270 to 400 t/ha for 
wood content in Amazonia with a conventional 50% carbon content. IPCC (2001) adopted a lower 
average value of 120 tC/ha for tropical forests. Of course the diversity of ecosystems makes it all the 
more complex. The Brazilian States of Mato Grosso, Para and Rondônia, have mixed forest-savannah 
ecosystems with a lower density of 70 tC/ha. Solving such measurement uncertainties is an obvious 
prerequisite to any LULUCF agreement.  
Beyond the difficulty of measuring the carbon balance of forests for a benchmark year, the complexity 
of deforestation dynamics is an additional obstacle to defining a reference scenario from which 
avoided emission could be calculated. The displacement of the agricultural frontier is indeed driven by 
a mix of factors hard to predict in advance and from which a large spectrum of baseline deforestation 
rates can be derived. The multiple factors which have a bearing on the displacement of the agricultural 
frontier are: the price of agricultural products; technological change; access to credit or the interest 
rate on borrowing; wage rates for agricultural labour; transport costs; infrastructure; and, property 
rights policy. It can be assumed also that the negotiation itself can have a perverse effect, if a country 
chooses to accelerate deforestation before the agreement fixes a starting year. Lastly, there is the 
problem of the anthropocentric origin and of the additionality of efforts to protect the forest, while the 
cost of thes efforts depends on the opportunity cost of land use, a factor depending on the country or 
region context. 
Controlling deforestation requires complex modalities (fitted to each national or regional context) and 
a perennial financial flow, if the control is to be sustainable. One question is whether LULUCF should 
be linked to carbon markets in the electricity sector and industry; it might increase the risk of volatility 
of the carbon price, with a specific risk of plunging to artificially low values. Furthermore the tropical 
forest produces externalities on biodiversity, on local climate apart from the global climate risk. 
Therefore, even though some incentives to stop deforestation can be found using carbon prices, it is 
                                                 
3
 cite par Texeira, 2006 
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not obvious that this carbon price should necessarily appear in a market including LULUCF and other 
emissions and it is sure that other types of domestic and international incentives have to be found in 
addition to carbon prices. The difficulty is that these incentives have to be targeted to reform deep 
features of the Brazilian society including land property rights and the informal economy. 
3.2. World-scale ethanol export program as a Brazilian climate contribution    
The cost efficiency of Brazilian ethanol production and Brazil’s comparative advantage in bioenergy 
are well-established facts, as documented in Table 1. This comparative advantage relies basically on 
the natural characteristics of Brazil, including its climate. But it relies also on a unique and long-
standing learning-by-doing process. For example, the high level of recycling of byproducts in the 
production process has played a central role in lowering the ethanol production cost in Brazil 
(Goldemberg et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Ethanol cost comparisons in- and outside Brazil 
Source: (1) Governor`s Ethanol Coalition/UNICAMP; (2) Datagro. Note: US$ 1 = R$ 2.5 
(average currency exchange rate of 2005). Source: UNICAMP (2005)  
 
Brazil exports ethanol to the USA, India, Venezuela, Nigeria, China, South Korea and the EU.  The 
total ethanol export to the USA amounts to 64% of the total ethanol export. 1.77 billion liters are 
submitted to a duty cost, while an additional 0.475 billion liters are exported through the indirect 
channel of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, CBI. In 2006 Japan negotiated an export potential to allow a 
3% share of ethanol in the gasoline and the EU has also declared a strong interest. Petrobras has 
embarked on a long-run scheme of investment including the building of a pipeline from the ethanol-
producing areas to the harbours. It anticipated to raise its ethanol exports by 320 million liters in 2006 
and by 850 million liters in 2007. The target is to export 3.5 billion liters per year around 204.  
However, although there is a well-documented technical report by the Unicamp University, there is no 
study so far of the overall economic implication of such a scheme for Brazil and for any ambitious 
climate policy of the international community.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Kojima (2007) 
Country Anhydrous ethanol cost production Raw material 
 US$/liter(1) US$/liter(2)  
Brazil - 0.20 sugar-cane 
Center-South 0.15  sugar-cane 
North-Northeast 0.18  sugar-cane 
USA 0.33 0.47 Corn 
Europe 0.55 0.97 beet, wheat 
Thailand  0.29 sugar-cane 
Australia  0.32 sugar-cane 
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4. Biofuels as a key incentive for Brazil to adhere to a 450 ppm 
Kyoto-type coalition 
Notwithstanding pending controversies about the net carbon benefit of producing energy through 
biomass (this net benefit is certain in the Brazilian case), we take it for granted that Brazil can 
significantly contribute to combating climate change by delivering large exports of ethanol. This 
section assesses what difference a huge ethanol export scheme could make for Brazilian development 
performance in a world where a regime constrains GHG to 450 ppm CO2-eq.  
This assessment was conducted within the MATISSE project using a new modeling tool, an 
architecture consisting of the coupling of a dynamic general equilibrium model, Imaclim-R, with a 
land-use model (Nexus Land-Use) and a model of agricultural activities (Agripole). As explained in 
the working paper presenting A novel hybrid architecture for agriculture and land use in an integrated 
modeling framework (MATISSE WP 27), the main specificities of IMACLIM consist of combining: a) 
hybrid modelling in value and in physical quantities; and, b) a growth engine that allows one to 
represent growth scenarios without equilibrium, thus offering new insights as compared to 
conventional general equilibrium models. We analyse three scenarios: the reference no-constrained 
(Business as usual) scenario; the world 450 ppm scenario applied to Brazil with no ethanol exports;, 
the same with an ethanol export scheme aiming at the level of 5% of the world demand. The scenarios 
have been analyzed through our dynamic general equilibrium model Imaclim-R. 
4.1. Brazil and the transition costs of a 450 stabilization scenario 
The aim of this paper is to disentangle the numerous dimensions of the climate-development nexus in 
the Brazilian case, and this effort would be diluted and its main conclusions blurred in an analysis 
embarking from the multiple variants of post-Kyoto institutional arrangements (type of quota 
allocations, permit trade patterns). This is why we selected an abstract perspective of a 450 ppm 
scenario in which all regions face the same carbon price and abate at the same marginal cost. This 
heuristic stylization holds with the heroic assumption that a benevolent planner knows all data 
perfectly so as to be able to allocate exactly the quotas in such a way that no trade would take place in 
a world-wide cap-and-trade system. In other words, if a country would like to import one ton of 
carbon, for any exogenous reason, this import would occur at this carbon price. For the sake of 
simplicity, this “modelled” world price follows a linear growth rate. 
4.1.1. Phases of losses and gains for Brazil 
Comparing the 450 ppm scenario GDP path followed in Brazil to the Brazil GDP path in the reference 
scenario (i.e. with no-carbon constraint), we find a counter-intuitive pattern. The global 450 ppm 
constraint created a GDP loss at the beginning and at the end of the 100-year simulation, and a GDP 
gain for about 30 years from around 2033 to the early 2060s (see Figure 2). Rather than the precise 
GDP differential values and their turning dates, we are interested here in identifying the parameters 
and the mechanisms that explain such a surprising result before understanding what a huge ethanol 
export scheme could do for Brazil in a world 450 ppm climate constraint regime.  
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Figure. 2. GDP loss or gain for Brazil in a world 450 ppm scenario. 
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Source: CIRED 
 
These ups and downs of GDP variations compared with the reference scenario can be explained by the 
interplay between the following factors: 
• the role of oil and gas imports expressed in volume and aggregate trade flows; 
• the share of energy expenses in the household budget; 
• the country terms of trade; 
• the share of the energy sector in the total investment of the economy. 
4.1.2. An alleviated oil and gas import bill  
The 450 ppm carbon constraint provokes a lower oil and gas demand on the world market, so that the 
export income flows to the Mid-East region decrease. The paradox is that this switch from the oil and 
gas rental income to a 450 ppm based carbon tax, postpones by more than three decades the date when 
the increasing world price for each fossil fuel reaches its asymptotic value exogenously defined by the 
cost of the coal to liquid conversion technology.  
In both the reference and 450 ppm scenario, the price of oil is multiplied by four compared with the 
2004 prices and the price of gas by 2.6; but in the 450 ppm scenario, this plateau is reached late at the 
end of the sixth decade of the 450 ppm scenario (see Figure 3).  
For importing countries including Brazil this price pattern alleviates the oil and gas dependency. In 
fact, we can see that the 450 ppm world price path for oil and gas is coincidental both in time and 
intensity with the GDP counter-intuitive path. The links are mainly due to two favorable effects: 
• the lower energy bill for both households and industry 
• a strong betterment of the terms of trade, and thus a lower import bill for Brazil. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of the fossil fuel prices in the 450 ppm scenario. 
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4.1.3. Evolution of the energy share in the household budget. 
The energy bill for households is driven by three factors: 
• the carbon price; 
• the real income, which increases with the development through time; 
• induced technical progress.  
In the reference scenario (i.e. a no-carbon constraint world), the energy bill in Brazil follows a soaring 
trend due to the unfavourable terms of trade and to the large sections of the middle classes moving to a 
more energy-intensive consumption pattern. The 450 ppm scenario creates a carbon price which 
immediately increases by 0.1% per year the relative share of the household energy budget (see Figure 
4). This is due to an inertia factor (the efficiency of existing equipment stock and the technical and 
social limits to accelerating its obsolescence rate), which lasts about 15 years before the 
counterbalancing effect of the autonomous energy efficiency progress comes into play combined with 
a technological and socio-economic response to the increasing energy consumer cost. The final 
decades accentuate this trend of a decreasing share of energy expenditures for households, despite the 
counter-effect of a rebound effect on mobility demand. 
MATISSE Working Paper 29 
 
13 
 
Figure 4. Energy expenses as a household budget share for the two scenarios.  
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It is to be stressed that the date at which the GDP losses start diminishing coincides with the 
bifurcation date to a decreasing energy share trend. This is due to the fact that the energy demand has a 
high priority in the household budget; its increase generates an adverse income effect that lowers the 
purchasing power of non-energy, which in turn impacts heavily on the GDP growth rate. Why then 
does the same decreasing trend (minus 1.5 % of the energy budget share) continue during the last third 
of the century but no longer coincide with a positive effect on GDP?  The reason is found in Figure 
4a., which shows the time profile of variations of GDP, the pathways of the household budget share 
allocated to transport and to energy expenditure, and, finally, the industry budget share allocated to 
energy. In short, the increase in the transport budget share in the middle of the period reveals a 
rebound effect of mobility demand, which cannot be compensated without a proactive set of 
infrastructural and real estate policies. This requires finding ways of avoiding irreversible mobility 
needs that are built into urban sprawl. This effect was already identified by Crassous et al.( 2006) who 
suggest that the carbon price cannot by itself provide a way out of such a lock-in. 
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Figure 4a. Path differences of the 450 ppm scenario as compared to the reference scenario: GDP; 
household budget share on transport and on energy; industry budget share on energy.  
 
 
Source: CIRED 
 
4.1.4. Role of balance of trade and of energy cost in production 
In the reference scenario, the balance of trade of Brazil follows the same pattern as other emerging 
countries. During most of the 100 year period, the real wage increases more rapidly than the labour 
productivity, while the high growth puts the balance of trade under the pressure of higher import of 
capital and consumption goods and more importantly of energy in the context of rising oil prices. 
After this long transition period Brazil has made up most of its initial wage and productivity lag and 
the terms of trade follow a reverse trend (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Evolution of Brazil balance of trade in two scenarios. 
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Source: CIRED 
The 450 ppm carbon constraint decreases still more rapidly the terms of trade reaching up to more 
than 20% below the reference case up to the 2030s due to various mechanisms. The main reason is the 
increase (especially from 2010 to 2042) of the energy component in the production cost of non-energy 
goods (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Energy cost component in the production cost of non-energy goods. 
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Source: CIRED 
 
Beyond 2050, the trend is reversed. In the long run, the 450 ppm constraint induces energy efficiency 
gains and lower fossil export prices, which allows Brazil to reduce its energy import bill. Balance of 
trade can thus improve. In turn the more favourable balance of trade triggers a higher demand due to a 
lower cost of the imported component of Brazilian consumption.  In other words, the purchasing 
power of Brazil improves in the long run.  
In total the carbon price has negative impacts on the Brazilian economy in the first period until an 
induced technical progress reverses the GDP situation as compared to the reference path.  The net cost 
of the 450 ppm carbon constraint is not at its apex when the carbon tax reaches about 800$/tC in 2050 
but in the short and medium run when the country faces the challenges of a more basic development 
stage. Thus the transition period to 2030 presents a difficult challenge and this may prevent Brazil 
from adhering to an internationally coordinated regime of climate policies. 
4.2. Managing the 450 ppm transition loss for Brazil through large-scale exports of 
ethanol? 
We have seen that Brazil would face its most challenging transition in the period up to 2030 in the 
case of a 450 ppm scenario, though it is not so vulnerable as some other emerging economies. Beyond 
2060, the net cost for Brazil could presumably be more sustainable if a set of low carbon technologies 
would offer the world a new carbon deal for reconciling climate and growth. From 2030 to 2060 the 
second generation bio-fuels might come into the picture. But it is difficult to assess this for Brazil 
because of the diversity of unknown factors such as the type of technology and what would it imply 
for the distribution of human settlements in Brazil and the valorization of biomass beyond ethanol.   
In the absence of a GE model for Brazil capable of integrating such land-use variables, we tested the 
new modeling structure elaborated during the MATISSE project to capture the impact on land rents 
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and on food prices But we decided to concentrate on the hypothesis of large exports of ethanol over 
the period between 2005 and 2030 for two reasons. The first is that this is the sensitive period for 
Brazil in a decarbonization strategy, the second is the availability of a reasonable set of expertise on 
data such as land and industrial productivity. Such a set of data was published just at the start of our 
MATISSE effort by a Unicamp study (see Annex), which assessed a possible program in Brazil for 
exporting ethanol by up to 5% of the world gasoline demand in 2030. We thus decided to embark on 
feeding those Unicamp expert data into our Imaclim-R land-use compact model.  
We test two variants with two contrasting land use hypotheses. With unconstrained land allocation, the 
biofuel expansion displaces other crops and by a domino effect it encroaches on the forest. At the 
other extreme is the ethanol expansion variant with no new land converted to crops. The 
environmental cost is assessed as the loss of natural environment. The social cost is assessed as the 
impact on the price of food and the income for the poor population. 
Figure 7 represents the impact on GDP of the Brazilian ethanol export program at 5% of the global 
market, as compared to the 450 ppm scenario in Brazil, and to the reference path in Brazil. The huge 
ethanol export program has a strong positive impact on the GDP path, which is above the reference 
path with the exception of the 23 to 30 year period. The GDP differential to the 450 ppm path is above 
2 percentage points on the 9 to 26 year period. This is explained by the impact of the biofuel export on 
the balance of trade and on the energy bill for industry and households, in turn explained by the lower 
oil and gas prices. 
Figure 8 shows that the biofuel export at a level of 25 billion US $ in 2030 has a strong trade balance 
impact of about 12 percentage point above the 450 ppm path. The stronger real purchasing power on 
foreign markets has a positive impact on the local activity measured by the GDP.  
 
Figure 7. GDP differences in Brazil between the reference case, the 450 ppm and the 450 + biofuels 
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Source: CIRED 
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Figure 8. Balance of trade path for 3 scenarios for Brazil  
 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1
1.1 
1.2 
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026
mer BRE 450 mer BRE REF mer 450 
 
Source: CIRED 
 
Figure 9 shows that the household energy budget share is lower in the ethanol export program than in 
the 450 ppm and even as compared to the reference scenario. This path is strongly correlated to the 
market exchange rate path. The link is indirect. The better exchange rate combined with the lower 
prices of oil and gas (see Figure 9) result in an increased household purchasing power, and thus a 
higher domestic demand. 
 
Figure 9. Brazilian household energy bill path in three scenarios 
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The world oil price is at its lowest in the 450 ppm with biofuel export program. An oil price reaching 
about 10% below the reference scenario affects the gas price and the price of the competing energies 
and this explains most of the lowering of the household energy budget share.  
 
Figure 10. World oil price path for three scenarios 
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Source: CIRED 
 
Lastly, the 5% biofuel component alleviates the oil refinery sector capacity constraint, a secondary 
factor contributing to lowering of the energy bill. In the reference scenario, pressures on the oil 
refining sector continue due to the difficulty in mobilizing investments quickly enough to meet an 
exploding demand. Refineries thus never operate at their optimal capacity. This is no longer the case 
with the slowdown of refining needs in the oil industry due to a higher penetration of biofuels. 
 
Thus in the scenario of a world 450 ppm stabilization scenario with a market represented through a 
unique carbon price, Brazilian cane-derived ethanol has a multifaceted comparative advantage  in 
terms of yield, environment and production cost, which led us to simulate the impact of an export 
program amouting to 5% of the projected world gasoline demand in 20505. The strict 450 ppm 
stabilization constraint depresses the oil and gas world price allowing a decrease of the energy budget 
share both for household and industry.² The remaining issue is the overall impact of such a strategy on 
development, the major concern being about its impact on food prices and the income level of fragile 
populations. 
4.3. Impact of a large scale exports of ethanol on land use and food prices 
To understand the specific development implications of large scale exports of biofuels, we first 
analyze a hypothetical policy scenario in which Brazil adheres to a 450 ppm agreement but uses only a 
domestic carbon tax to achieve it and does not export biofuels beyond the baseline (for example, due 
to disputes in Annex 1 countries about the ultimate impact of this technology). In such a scenario 
(denoted TAX), the ethanol area reaches 21 M ha in 2025, all for the domestic market (see Table 2). 
This amount has to be compared with 4 M ha today and 18.6 in the reference scenario in 2035, 
                                                 
5
 According to the International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 
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including 5 M ha for exports. Around 2025 the food prices are 6 % above what they are in the 
Reference scenario (see Figure 11). This food price pressure results from the carbon constraint (2011) 
and it comes back to nil slightly before 2040.  
 
SCENARIO 
Ethanol 
production 
(M tep) 
Ethanol Area 
Mha (including 
exports 
Scenario details 
 9   4   Starting in 2010 
  2025 2025 Scenario (2011-2050) 
REF 70 18.6    Reference (**) case (no carbon constraint) 
TAX  79 21     
Tax (quotas for a 450 ppm stabilization) no 
export 
TAX EXP 79 21 Tax+Exp (same 450 ppm + Bio5% export) 
TAX EXP 
CON (*) 
70 18.6 
Tax+Exp+Con (*) (with a ceiling of 20 M ha on 
the total additional cropped land) 
Table 2. Bio-Ethanol data in various scenarios for Brazil (2010-2035) 
(*)TAX EXP CON: In this variant CON stands for land constraint. We assume that the total cropped 
area is limited to 80 M ha in 2025 (including the ethanol-derived sugar cane), whereas the 2006 
cropped area is 60 M ha, including 6 M ha in cane in 2006. 
 
 
Figure 11. Impact of three scenarios on agricultural prices comparing to the reference scenario 
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Through time, the pressure decreases after a peak of the additional land allocated to ethanol around 
2021. The major information from this simulation is the existence of a peak in the increase of food 
prices compared with the baseline. This is obviously due to the fact that the control on mobility in 
Brazil and in the world lowers the demand for fuel. The food price differential disappears around 2021 
and this results from the control of mobility needs in a 450 ppm scenario.  
This good news no longer holds in the Tax-Exp scenario. In this scenario, we combine the 450 ppm 
constraint with an ethanol export program, reaching 5% of the world biofuel demand in 2025. It results 
in the following: 
the food price increases up to nearly 8% compared with baseline instead of 5% in the tax only 
scenario;   
the total of the additional land allocated to ethanol remains at 21 M ha in 2025 ; 
the gap between this TAX-EXP scenario and the TAXE (only) widens beyond 2028 and peaks around 
2041; 
Let us try first to explain the most intriguing results before commenting upon the increase in food 
prices. In the TAX + EXP + CON, the previous scenario is submitted to a land constraint of 80 M ha 
for the total cropped land (20 Mh above the 2006-10 level). This land ceiling constraint leads to the 
total ethanol land allocation set at a ceiling of 18.6 M Ha ; the food prices are pushed slightly upwards 
by about 0.5% (starting from almost 7% up to 8.3%). 
The easiest to explain is that the increase in food prices starts diminishing before 2045 instead of 2028 
in the tax only scenario. This results simply from the fact that ethanol production is driven by world 
demand. This world demand for ethanol results from the higher competitiveness of this energy in a 
450 ppm world and from the aggregate evolution of world demand for fuels. This latter effect, driven 
by a lower increase in mobility needs, starts compensating for the former only beyond 2045 at the 
world scale whereas, the share of ethanol in Brazil is almost 100% as early as 2025. Therefore it is not 
long before the reduction of mobility drives a reduction in ethanol demand. 
More intriguing is the unchanged amount of land dedicated to the production of ethanol in the export 
scenario. This is totally due to the technical inertia incorporated in the Nexus-Imaclim structure. As 
for the oil refineries, this is due to the inertia in deploying the infrastructure for converting sugar cane 
into ethanol. Secondly there is limit on the rate of displacement of the geographical frontier of sugar 
cane production, including the deployment of transportation infrastructures. These two constraints 
have been placed in accordance with local expertise and it happens that they met in any 450 ppm 
scenario (which was not expected ex-ante). Perhaps both inertia assumptions are too pessimistic but 
the simulation modeling underlines again the role of technical and institutional inertia, which are 
neglected in many analyses. 
The existence of these deployment constraints explains why the main difference between the export 
and tax only scenario lies in the allocation of land between domestic and export markets. In the tax 
only scenario, 21 M ha are devoted to domestic consumption, whereas one third if this area is devoted 
to foreign markets in the export scenario with Brazil covering the rest of its fuel demand by domestic 
and imported oil. 
This result may seem surprising in the sense that a lot of attention is currently devoted to the impact of 
biofuel production on food prices. However it can be easily explained by the fact that the decrease in 
available land between the two scenarios is only 11%, which is consistent with a maximum additional 
increase of 18% in food prices. But this increase quickly diminishes thanks to the intensification of 
agriculture as a response to limits on land availability and to the decreasing trend of ethanol export 
demand. But in total, this result simply confirms that the US situation (which triggered tensions 
regarding the price of basic food in Mexico) is by no way comparable with the Brazilian one. In Brazil 
indeed, the amount of land is not constrained; the main issues are the protection of natural lands and 
the domino effect from higher production of ethanol to the conversion of new pasture land and forest 
into agricultural lands.  
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5. Conclusion 
The main conclusion of this paper is not substantive in nature, although we venture to think that some 
useful policy insights can be derived from it: a) the contribution of biofuels to lower the transition 
costs imposed on Brazil by tight carbon constraints, b) the impact of large exports of ethanol on oil 
prices, c) the fact that the increase in ethanol production leads to significant increase in food prices in 
Brazil (from 5.5% to 8.3% depending on the limits on land) which may offset the overall economic 
benefits of this strategy for the low income population. 
The main conclusion is methodological in nature since the above insights, although preliminary, could 
not have been delivered without a modeling tool allowing first the representation of disequilibrium 
pathways and endogenous technical change. The importance of that can be seen in the unevenness of 
GDP variations between our reference and policy scenarios, whereas the conventional models tend to 
represent cost curves smoothly increasing over time. The second lesson is about the importance of a 
transparent tool to convey engineering and geographical information, based on physical indicators into 
the value flows of any economic model. This transparency helps in particular in better understanding 
the ultimate importance of controversial views about technology. 
The last conclusion is that this new generation of models, with these three characteristics of a dual 
description of the economy in physical and value flow, of an endogenous description of technical 
change and of a growth engine allowing for transitory disequilibrium, will not provide credible policy 
insights until they are elaborated in a collaborative way with scientists and actors that can control the 
quality and relevance of information on local mechanisms and specific contexts (in this paper through 
CIRED a long standing collaboration with Brazilian experts). In addition to serving as a 
communication language between disciplines they should aim at bridging the aggregation gap between 
local and global analysis of sustainability issues. 
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Annex: Ethanol expansion program for Brazil  
The aim of the project is to simulate the economic impacts in the Brazilian economy of an increase in 
the domestic sugar-cane ethanol production. Some scenarios will be built in order to assess the 
opportunity costs for land use and energy use from biomass and its impact on GDP, due to distinct 
increases in the amount of ethanol production under the most likely technological options for the near 
future. Some studies have already tried to simulate the impacts on GDP due to an increase in ethanol 
production. However they have not addressed the question of what would be the optimal export level 
for Brazilian ethanol or even the equilibrium price for ethanol under distinct levels of world ethanol 
demand.  
This is the case of the most recent study ordered by the Brazilian government to Unicamp 
(Universidade Estadual de Campinas). It simulated the impacts on the domestic economy if the 
ethanol production increased in order to meet the domestic demand and also to replace 5 or 10 percent 
of the international demand for gasoline up to 2025. In this case, the demand and the price are 
exogenous factors, not a result of the analysis. It is worth mentioning that ethanol can be added to pure 
gasoline up to 25% in volume without special technology adjustments on the fleet or can be used as an 
input to produce ETBE (a gasoline additive). This makes ethanol a perfect substitute for gasoline in 
the international market as required by the simulations to be done by Imaclim. 
The simulations also rest on the fact that the Brazilian ethanol has highly competitive prices and 
therefore the international commercial barriers (or local subsidies and other political measures that 
support local deficient production) from potential buyers could fall at anytime.A comparison among 
the production costs worldwide is given in Table A.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Ethanol production cost: an international comparison  
Source: (1) Governor`s Ethanol Coalition/UNICAMP; (2) Datagro. Note: US$ 1 = R$ 2.5 (average 
currency exchange rate of 2005). Source: UNICAMP (2005)  
The study conducted by Unicamp (University of Campinas, 2005) has tested the hypothesis, where the 
ethanol would substitute 5% of the world demand for gasoline. The main assumptions of this study are 
as follows. 
Country Anhydrous ethanol cost production Raw material 
 US$/liter(1) US$/liter(2)  
Brazil  0.20 sugar-cane 
Center-South 0.15  sugar-cane 
North-Northeast 0.18  sugar-cane 
USA 0.33 0.47 corn 
Europe 0.55 0.97 beet, wheat 
Thailand  0.29 sugar-cane 
Australia  0.32 sugar-cane 
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Synthesis of the Main Assumptions and Results of the Unicamp Simulation with Exogenous Demand 
and Price for the Brazilian Ethanol 
 
1 Potential Market 
Gasoline is mainly used in the light duty fleet that nowadays consumes more than 1.15 trillion liters of 
gasoline per year. It is foreseen that in 2025 this fuel consumption would be 48% higher, demanding 
approximately 1.7 trillion liters (EIA, 2004). To supply 5% of such demand, Brazil would need to 
produce an extra amount of 102.5 billion liters of ethanol per year,6 which would require 17.5 million 
hectares of land, less than 20% of the available area that does not require irrigation. 
 
2 Current domestic sugar-cane and ethanol production profile 
Brazilian ethanol is made from sugar cane with crops producing 31% of the world sugar-cane 
production. They occupy 5.6 x 106 hectares of land, which ranks third in extension in the country, just 
after soya and corn, as presented in the following figure. 
Figure A.1. Area allocation in Brazil (million hectares) 
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Source: IBGE 2004 
 
 
The country production of sugar-cane and ethanol is divided between two main areas: the Center-
South Region and the North-Northeast Region, as plotted in the following figure. 
                                                 
6
 In general, a liter of anhydrous ethanol can substitute 0.8 liters of gasoline. When mixed with gasoline in a 
small proportion, we can assume that one liter of ethanol substitutes one liter of gasoline. 
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Figure A.2. Distribution of the sugar-cane plants in Brazil 
 
Source: UNICAMP 
 
The sugar-cane from the Center-South Region is responsible for 85% of the total Brazilian production 
and it goes from April to November. In the North-Northeast Region, the remaining 15% is produced 
from September to March. Gains of productivity in the sugar-cane crops have been increasing since 
the seventies and are mainly due to genetic improvement of seeds, harvesting mechanization (that 
reached 34% of the whole harvested area in the Center-South Region in 2005 but is still not in practice 
in the North-Northeast Region), biological control of pests, effluent recycle and agricultural best 
management practices7 . No genetically modified sugar-cane seeds are being used in the country. 
 
                                                 
7
 Planting mechanization is not taking place in the whole country 
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Figure A.3. Agricultural cane yield per region in Brazil 
 
 
 
 
Source: IBGE, 2003 
 
There are two kinds of sugar-cane mills: those that produce only sugar and those that produce both 
sugar and ethanol. Distilleries produce just ethanol. In 2002, there were 318 production units as below: 
Sugar-cane mills: 15 
Mills with distilleries (flexible mills): 199 
Autonomous distilleries: 104 
The efficiency of the mills varies according to the share of ethanol and sugar production in each one. 
Distilleries are able to produce up to 85 liters of ethanol per ton of sugar-cane (maximum value 
obtained in an efficient plant). The environmental consequences of the sugar-cane and of the ethanol 
production are relevant aspects to be considered when expansion of the production is under 
assessment. According to Unicamp (2005), it is important to compare the ethanol production to the 
alternative uses of land and water and to other industrial processes that would take place if no increase 
in the production of ethanol were observed. Impacts like erosion, biodiversity damage, use of 
chemicals, emissions, etc., must be assessed considering the cane replacing extensive grazing or 
orange crops, as it has been happening, or natural biomes like Cerrado and forests in other cases.  
The production of sugar cane and ethanol in Brazil today has interesting environmental features:  low 
use of agricultural pesticides; efficient and comprehensive biological control of pests; lowest level of 
soil depletion in the agricultural sector; efficient recycling of all waste produced; and no threats to the 
quality of water resources. However, it is worth mentioning that although there is no need for crop 
irrigation, the ethanol production requires huge amounts of water and a better knowledge about the 
water availability is still required. 
To simulate the outcomes of an expansion in the ethanol production to meet 5% of the world gasoline 
demand in 2025 (102.5 billion liters of ethanol), it is assumed that the best practice management 
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would be adopted by farmers and ethanol producers and that the best available land would be 
converted into sugar-cane crops. It is very important to stress that the projections were made based 
solely on the first generation technology for ethanol production. Moreover, Brazil has a big diversity 
in types of soil and climate conditions because of its continental dimensions, resulting in a wide range 
of potential for agricultural use of land. This diversity, together with the limitations imposed by 
slopes8 and by environmentally sensitive regions like the Amazon, the Pantanal, the Atlantic forest, the 
ecological reserves, etc., demanded an integrated assessment in order to identify those areas suited to 
the expansion of the sugar-cane crops. 
Considering that on part of this land there are already other crops and that therefore it would be 
excluded from the total area to be converted in cane crops, 28.4 M ha is left to be dedicated to the 
expansion of ethanol production in Brazil as compared to the current 200 M ha allocated to cattle 
raising and the 60 M ha of cropped area including 6 M ha for sugar cane. The Center-South Region 
would convert 60% of the total demanded area while the North-Northeast would convert 40%. Taking 
into consideration that one agro business unit takes four years to be operational from its conception, 
the following schedule for ethanol availability would be possible. 
 
2,353.6
20.8
4,701.5
26.8
13,713.8
34.8
44,306.5              
68,513.2
39.3
65.2 60.773.279.2
25,683.012,835.08,982.57,331.44,802.4
5,621.0 8,242.4
89.985.4
11.114.6
911.0818.6
112,819.739,396.817,537.511,336.1
 
Table A.2. Increase in the Ethanol Production for Export Purposes 
 
Unicamp (2005) assumes that: the new areas dedicated to the extension of ethanol production would 
be based on the following principles aimed at capturing scale economies. 
The distilleries would be set in clusters of 15 plants in order to facilitate the transport of the ethanol to 
ports by pipelines (considered the best cost-effective transport option).  
They would total 615 new plants. 
Land productivity would have an average efficiency of 71.5 tonnes of sugar-cane per hectare. 
A standard distillery in the cluster would process 2 million tons of sugar-cane per year.   
Each distillery would require an area of 35,000 hectares of sugar-cane (with 20% of them being used 
as environmental reserves as determined by law). 
Distillery productivity would have an average efficiency of 85 liters of anhydrous ethanol per ton of 
sugar-cane.  
The average production of one distillery would be 170 m3 of ethanol per year.  
All harvesting would be mechanical9. 
                                                 
8
 Areas with 12% slope or more are not suited to sugar-cane crops. 
9
 In São Paulo, the state which produces most ethanol in Brazil, the law 10.547 from 2000, due to environment 
concerns, established a schedule to banish the use of fire in harvesting in 20 years. Other states may follow this 
path. 
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With respect to the costs, the projections rely on the following data:  
 Real $ per ton % 
Sugar-cane cost 390.12 68.5%
Industrial costs 132.7 23.3%
Management costs 46.87 8.2%
 569.69 100.0%
Table A.3. Production Costs in a Standard Distillery 
Note: US$ 1 = R$ 2.5 (average currency exchange rate of 2005) 
Source: Unicamp 
 
The costs above can be broken down into the following: 
 R$/ton % 
Crop formation 5.56 16.8% 
Handling of the plant 1.07 3.2% 
Handling of the roots 879 26.5% 
Harvest and transport 11.1 33.5% 
Agricultural management 1.33 4.0% 
Land remuneration 5.31 16.0% 
total 33.16 100.0% 
Table A.4. Sugar-cane Average Production Costs 
Note: US$ 1 = R$ 2.5 (average currency exchange rate of 2005) 
Source: Unicamp 
 
 R$/ton % 
Wages and social security costs 28.86 21.7%
Depreciation 26.5 20.0%
Chemical products 21.63 16.3%
Lubricant oils 3.43 2.6%
Material for maintenance   20.97 15.8%
Third part services 8.74 6.6%
Others 22.58 17.0%
total 132.71 100.00% 
Table A.5. Standard Distillery Average Operational Costs 
Source: Unicamp 
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 R$/ton % 
Wages and social security costs 15.66 33.4%
Third part services 6.41 13.7%
Social assistance 8.96 33.8%
Others 15.84 19.1%
Total  46.87 100.0%
Table A.6. Standard Distillery Average Management Costs 
Note: US$ 1 = R$ 2.5 (average currency exchange rate of 2005) 
Source: Unicamp 
 
3 Investments 
To reach the export target, 615 new distilleries with 2 million tons of cane-processing capacity will be 
needed. The whole investment in the agro-business is estimated to be R$ 172.2 billion (of 2005) plus 
R$ 21.3 billion in pipelines and port infrastructure, adding up to R$ 193.5 billion. This amount 
represents an average investment of R$ 9.676 billion annually, around 0.51% of the GDP in 2004.  
The economic assessment uses 2002 values and they are summarized below: 
 usine culture Pipeline & ports total 
Machines  78.06 3.49 10.72 122.27 
Camions  2.20  2.20 
Ouvrage civil 9.76 1.78 4.12 15.66 
subcontracted services 9.76 0.00 1.65 1.41 
total 97.57 37.48 16.48 15.54 
Table A.7. Investments (R$ billion – 2002) 
Source: Unicamp 
 
4 Income 
Considering the costs presented above and the returns that the investments require, the ethanol FOB 
price should be at least US$ 0.30 per liter approximately, equivalent to US$ 48.0 for an oil barrel. This 
would total US$ 31.4 billion in 2025.  Brazilian total exports reached US$ 117.0 billion in 2005. The 
foreseen ethanol exports would then represent 27% of the current total exports in 2025, a huge impact 
on the balance of payments. 
 
5 Other Relevant Aspects 
Electricity generation in Brazil is mainly based on hydropower plants (80% approximately). However, 
the system is being expanded and the opportunities for hydro generation occur in the Amazon Region 
that is very distant from the consumer centers and there are great environmental concerns due to the 
threats to the rainforest. Recent bids for electricity supply show that coal plants are very likely to 
become an important source, which raises environmental concerns because of the global warming 
implications. 
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In this sense, the expansion of the ethanol production could provide the national grid with an extra 
amount of energy of 4 kWh per ton of sugar beyond the electricity needs of the ethanol production 
itself. This amounts to an annual supply of 4920 GWh. 
 
6 Economic Assessment 
An economic analysis of the impacts on the Brazilian economy due to an increase in the ethanol 
production was performed using a 1996 input-output matrix updated to 2002. This matrix was also 
expanded to incorporate distinct production processes (with and without mechanical harvesting and its 
impacts on labor). The above UNICAMP data have been adapted to our Imaclim-R and Imaclim Land 
use modeling tool. 
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